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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O,F THE STATE OF UTAH
BETIT

J.

WICKES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMP ANY, an Illinois corporation,

12598

Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing
and Supporting Brief

Plaintiff and Appellant, Betty ]. Wickes, by and through
her counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 7 6 ( e), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, respectfully petitions this Honorable Court
for a rehearing in the above-entitled cause upon the ground
that the decision rendered by the Court on April 17, 1972 is in
error insofar as it rejects Appellant's claim as set forth under
Point III in Appellant's Brief.
WHEREFORE, Appellant requests that a rehearing be
granted and that the Court re-examine the law and the record
1

and reverse the lower court judgment and direct that judgment be entered in favor of the Appellant.
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

By -- ---- -- ------ ---- ------ --- -- ----- --- -- -------- ------- -Allan L. Larson
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant

7th Floor Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE SUPRElv!E COURr-f
OF rfHE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY

J.

WICKES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUiOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMP ANY, an Illinois corporation,

Case No.
12598

Defendant and Respondent.

Brief in Support of Appellant's
P·etition for Rehearing

ARGUMENT
THE COURT'S OPINION IN REGARD TO
POINT III OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS
IN ERROR AS TO THE FACTS AND THE LAW
Point III of the Appellant's Brief was that the acceptance
of the premium by the defendant insurance company after
notice of the loss constituted a waiver of the timely payment
of the premium and thus coverage existed for the death of
Homer Wickes.
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In rejecting this argument of the Appellant, the Court
observes in its opinion that that argument is not appropriate
since the premium was not paid within ten days after the policy
lapsed, and that "hence the policy by its terms was not effective until the date when the premium was received by the
defendant." The opinion goes on to state that "the 40-day
provision of the policy governs here, and the policy only became effective August 18, 1969 . . . . " It is respectfully submitted that this interpretation of the record is in error. The
policy itself provided that it terminated automatically if a
premium was not received by the due date, either February 1
or August 1. The only document wherein it is set forth that
the policy is continuous if the premium is received within ten
days, or is reinstated if the premium is received within 40 days,
is the premium notice, unsigned by any agent or representative
of the company. Nowhere does the policy state that coverage
will be continuous if the premium is received within ten days,
or that the policy will be reinstated if the premium is received within 40 days. This fact is the very heart of the Appellant's argument in Point III.

Any statements made by Mr. Starbuck to James Wickes,
or any representations or terms as set forth on the unsigned
premium notice, are irrelevant. The policy of insurance provided that the terms thereof could not be changed except by
an endorsement signed by an officer of the insurance company. The "10-40 notice" does not meet that requirement.
Section 31-19-26 and Section 31-19-20, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) provide that no modification of an insurance
contract shall be effective unless in writing and containing
at least a facsimile signature of the insurer or an officer thereof·
The "10-40 notice" does not meet those requirements.

The Court's opinion states that the provisions of an insurance policy must be enforced as written, and cannot be
changed or modified in favor of the insured except by a writing signed by the insurer, and that no such writing was ever
made by the defendant in this case. The Court's opinion is internally inconsistent in that it states that the provisions of the
policy must govern, but then goes on to say that a ten-day provision, or a 40-day provision, completely outside the terms
of the policy, must be given effect. The law is clear, however,
that the "10-40 notice" cannot vary the terms of the policy.
Thus, the only issue to be decided is the legal effect of the
acceptance of the $48.00 premium by the insurance company after it had notice of the death of Homer Wickes. "That
insurance co1upanies may waive prompt payment of policies,
although such payment is of the essence of the contract of insurance . . . is too well settled to admit of dispute." Loftis v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California, 114 P.
134, 38 Utah 532 (1911).
The general rule was also stated in Sztllivan v. Beneficial
Life Insurance Company, 64 P.2d 351, 91 Utah 405 (1937)
wherein the Court stated that "where there has been a default
in the payment of a premium . . . justifying a forfeiture of
the contract such forfeiture is waived if, with knowledge of
'
all the facts, the insurer, either before or after the death of the
insured, unconditionally accepts and retains the specific premium or assessment for which the insured was delinquent"
(emphasis added) .

The general view, including that of the Utah Supreme
Court, is that acceptance of a past-due premium after knowledge of the loss constitutes a waiver of the timely payment of
the premium. An extensive collection of cases expressing that
view is found in 7 A.L.R. 3d 414.
The Utah Supreme Court has held many times that an
insurance company cannot treat a policy as being in effect
for the purpose of collecting premiums but then claim that it
was not in effect for purposes of meeting its obligations thereunder. Parker v. California State Life Insurance Company, 40
P.2d 175, 85 Utah 595 ( 1935); Farrington v. Granite State
Fire Insurance Company, 232 P.2d 754, 120 Utah 109 ( 1951).
It is clear from the record that the defendant insurance company continued to collect premiums even after August 1, 1969.
In fact, the "10-40 notice" was not even mailed from the de·
fondant's office until the third day after the policy had allegedly
expired.

It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. By its terms the policy expired on August 1. The defendant continued thereafter to
attempt to collect the premium which should have been paid
on August 1. The defendant at all times knew that Homer
Wickes had been killed in an automobile accident. The Appellant finally did pay the premium and the company accepted it.
The law is clear that such a state of facts constitutes a waiver
of the timely payment of the premium and that coverage is
extended for a loss, occurring during the interim, of which the
defendant had know ledge.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in its
assi.:mption that the "ten day" and ''40-day" provisions were
found in the policy. In fact, the record is clear that such provisions are found only in a premium notice, which premium
notice cannot vary the terms of the policy itself. It is clear
that the actions of the defendant in accepting the past-due
premium with knowledge of the loss entitle the Appellant to
judgment as a matter of law. The Court should reverse the
judgment in favor of the Defendant and direct that judgment
be entered in favor of the Plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted this ____________ day of ----------·--·------,
1972.

WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
By-------------------·----------------------··---Allan L. Larson

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant

7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
brief to David K. Winder at 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah on this ____________ day of --------------------·-------, 1972.
---------------------- ------------------------------

Allan L. Larson
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